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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a general equilibrium model with
endogenous specialization to show that the relationship between economic development and
inequality of income distribution is neither monotonic nor an inverted U-curve. Second, we use
the general equilibrium model to investigate interdependence between the extent of the market,
the level of division of labor, productivity, and the degree of inequality of income distribution.
Let us motivate the two tasks one by one. Krugman (1995, 1996) and Krugman and
Venables (1995) vividly document the fact that the relationship between economic development
and income distribution comes to the focus of public concern in the 1970s and 1990s. But this is
always a controversial issue in economic literature. Some models and theories are developed,
with empirical evidence sometimes, to show that there is a positive correlation between
economic development and inequality of income distribution (Banerjee and Newman, 1993,
Lewis, 1955, Palma, 1978, Li and Zou, 1998, for instance). Other models are developed, with
empirical evidence sometime, to show that there is a negative correlation between inequality and
international trade, which relates to economic development (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Galor and
Zeira, 1993, Thompson, 1995 and Fei, Ranis, and  Kuo, 1979, Frank, 1977, Balassa, 1986, for
instance).
Not only data from developing and newly industrialized countries are contradictory, but
also data from developed countries generate more controversies.  Kuznetz (1955) proposed the
hypothesis of inverted U-curve of the relationship between inequality and per capita income and2
provided some support for it from US data. Krugman and Venables (1995) use a general
equilibrium model with global economies of scale to predict such an inverted U-curve of
inequality. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) use a dynamic equilibrium model to predict the
inverted U-curve. Some theories and data show that there is a negative or insignificant
correlation between trade or development and inequality in the developed country (see, for
instance, Krugman and Lawrence, 1994 and Katz and Murphy, 1992). Others show a positive
correlation between trade and inequality in the developed country (see, for instance, Grossman,
1998, Murphy and Welch, 1991, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1992, Karoly and Klerman, 1994,
Sachs  and Shatz, 1995 ).
1 But Ram (1997) provides new empirical evidence for an uninverted-U
pattern in the developed  countries, taking into account of data since World War II. Jones (1998,
p. 65) also shows that the ratio of GDP per worker in the 5
th-richest country to GDP per worker
in the 5
th-poorest country fluctuated from 1960 to 1990.
The controversy and new evidences call for new models and theories that can resolve it.
In the current paper, we develop a general equilibrium model to show that the relationship
between inequality and trade that relates to economic development is neither monotonic nor an
inverted U-curve.
In our general equilibrium model of endogenous specialization, economic development is
described as an evolutionary process of division of labor that is driven by improvements in
transaction conditions. Because of differences in transaction conditions between countries and
between different groups of residents in the same country, those individuals with better
transaction conditions will be involved in the division of labor and related trade before others are.
Inequality increases because of the dual structure. As latecomers catch up, the dual structure
                                                
1 Recent surveys on the relationship between trade and income distribution in developed countries can be found from3
disappears, so that inequality declines. As the leading group goes to an even higher level of
specialization, leaving others behind, dual structure emerges and inequality increases again. As
latecomers catch up, the dual structure disappears and inequality decreases again. This ratcheting
process of inequality and equality generates fluctuation of the degree of inequality of income
distribution. This implies that the relationship between inequality and economic development is
neither monotonically positive nor monotonically negative. It may not be a simple inverted U-
curve.
The intuition behind the model is as follows. If the relationship between inequality and
economic development is monotonic, then in the very developed country, income distribution
must be either extremely equal or extremely unequal. This is true too for an inverted U-curve
between inequality and per capital income. But we cannot see either of these two extreme cases.
Hence, inequality of income distribution must fluctuate as the equilibrium level of division of
labor evolves. This evolution gets a group of individuals involved in a higher level of division of
labor earlier than others. Hence, a dual structure in which some individuals are more specialized
(or more commercialized) than others keeps emerging and disappearing as the equilibrium level
of division of labor increases. A new data set in Deininger and Squire (1996) supports our
hypothesis. It indicates that there is no systematical link between growth and changes in
aggregate inequality.
The second purpose of the current paper is to explore the intrinsic relationship between
the development of division of labor and changes in inequality of income distribution. Kuznetz
(1955) explained inequality of income distribution by per capita income. This is certainly not a
general equilibrium view since per capita income is endogenous in a general equilibrium model,
                                                                                                                                                            
Cline (1997), Williamson (1998), and Burtless (1995).4
which itself should be explained by parameters. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) show that
unequal income distribution restricts the extent of the market, so that economies of scale cannot
be fully exploited and economic development is retarded. We put this idea together with Allyn
Young's conjecture that "not only division of labor is dependent on the extent of the market, but
also, the extent of the market is determined by the level of division of labor", to develop a
general equilibrium mechanism that simultaneously determines the extent of the market, the level
of division of labor, productivity, and degree of inequality of income distribution.
We will examine effects of the coexistence of exogenous and endogneous comparative
advantages on inequality of income distribution. Yang (1994) and Yang and Borland (1991) have
drawn the distinction between David Ricardo’s exogenous comparative advantage (Ricardo,
1817) and Adam Smith’s endogenous comparative advantage (Smith, 1776).
 2 There is an
extensive literature on exogenous comparative advantage in trade theory (see, for instance, Dixit
and Norman, 1980). Separately, there are many models of endogenous comparative advantage in
the growing literature on endogenous specialization (see Yang and Ng, 1998 for a recent survey
on this literature and references there). The current paper develops a general equilibrium model
with the trade off between transaction costs and endogenous and exogenous comparative
advantages. We shall show that as transaction conditions are improved, the scope for efficiently
balancing this trade off is enlarged. Hence, the equilibrium level of division of labor increases.
The existence of exogenous comparative advantage implies that different types of individuals are
sequentially involved in the division of labor. Part of the population are first involved in a low
level of division of labor, the rest being left behind. The emergence of this dual structure
                                                
2 Endogenous comparative advantage is associated with economies of specialization and referred to by Grossman
and Helpman (1991) as acquired comparative advantage, whereas exogenous comparative advantage is associated
with constant returns to scale in production, referred to by them as natural comparative advantage.5
increases inequality of income distribution. Then the rest of the population are involved in this
low level of division of labor, catching up rich fellows. This catch up process reduces duality and
related inequality. Then, part of the population go to an even higher level of division of labor,
increasing duality and related inequality. Then the rest who are left behind catch up, reducing
duality and inequality again. This ratcheting process goes on, generating fluctuation of the degree
of duality of economic structure and of the degree of inequality of income distribution. In this
development process, the most important determinant of equilibrium aggregate productivity and
welfare is transaction condition rather than inequality of income distribution. This is called
irrelevance of inequality (or equality) of income distribution to economic development.
Early studies of structural changes and dual structure rely on the assumption of
disequilibrium in some markets to predict dual structure and structural changes. For instance,
Lewis (1955) tried to explain dual structure between commercialized and self-sufficient sectors
by evolution of division of labor and related productivity progress (see also Ranis, 1988). Due to
lack of appropriate analytical tools, he ended up with a model based on disequilibrium in labor
market caused by institutional wage. Chenery (1979) used market disequilibrium to explain
structural changes. Recently, general equilibrium models are used to study dual structure. In
some of these models, such as in Khandker and Rashid’s equilibrium model (1995), dual
structure is exogenously assumed.
3 They cannot predict the emergence and evolution of dual
structure. In a recent literature of formal equilibrium models of high development economics,
evolution of dual structure between the manufacturing sector with economies of scale in
production and the agricultural sector with constant returns to scale can be predicted (see
Krugman and Vanables, 1995, 1996, and Fujita and Krugman, 1995). The equilibrium models6
with endogenous geographical location of economic activities of Krugman and Venables (1995)
and Baldwin and Venables (1995) attribute the emergence of dual structure to the geographical
concentration of economic activities in economic development that marginalizes peripheral areas.
Kelly (1997), based on Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), develops a dynamic general
equilibrium model that predicts spontaneous evolution of a dual structure between the modern
sector with economies of scale and the traditional sector with constant returns technology. As
transaction conditions are sufficiently improved, the level of division of labor increases and dual
structure disappears. Our model in this paper is complementary to these general equilibrium
models that predict the emergence and evolution of dual structure. We pay more attention to the
effects of evolution of individuals’ levels of specialization and the coexistence of exogenous and
endogenous comparative advantages on the emergence and evolution of dual structure.
4
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the 2x2 Ricardian
model with transaction costs and endogenous and exogenous comparative advantages.  Section 3
solves for general equilibrium and its inframarginal comparative statics. Section 4 extends the
analysis to consider not only income distribution in the developing country but also that in the
developed country.  The concluding section summarizes the findings of the paper and suggests
possible extensions.
2. A Ricardian Model with Endogenous and Exogenous Comparative Advantages
Consider a world consisting of country 1 and country 2, each with Mi (i=1, 2) consumer-
producers.  The set of individuals is a continuum and mass of population is 1. There are two
types of individuals in country 1. The mass of type a persons is Ma and that of type b persons is
                                                                                                                                                            
3 Also, in Dixit’s dynamic planning model (1968), the existence of labor surplus is exogenously assumed.
4 Mokyr (1993, pp. 65-66) documents evolution of individuals’ level of specialization during the Industrial
Revolution in Britain. This evolution is sometimes referred to as “industrious revolution” which implies that self-
provided home production is replaced with commercialized production. Yang, Wang, and Wills (1992) find
empirical evidence for this evolution from China’s data. A difference in empirical implications generated by the
Krugman and Venables model and our model is that the former yields scale effects (productivity of the
manufacturing firm increases if and only if its size increases), but the latter does not.7
Mb, where Ma + Ma + M2 = 1. All individuals in country 2 are assumed to be identical, but
different from individuals in country 1.  The utility function for individuals of type i is
(1)
b b - + + =




i i i i y k y x k x U , i = a, b, 2.
where xi, yi are quantities of goods x and y produced for self-consumption, xi
d, yi
d are quantities
of the two goods bought from the market, and ki is the transaction efficiency coefficient for a type
i individual. The transaction cost is assumed to take the iceberg form: for each unit of good
bought, a fraction 1-ki is lost in transit, the remaining fraction ki is received by the buyer.   Type a
persons and type b persons are distinguished by their transaction conditions. We assume that ka =
k, kb = t, and k > t. In other words, each type a persons has higher transaction efficiency than each
type b person. Also, we assume that k2 = k. The assumptions can be interpreted as follows.
Country 1 is a developed country which has better transaction conditions. Country 2 is a less
developed country where some residents (who might be urban or coastal residents) have the same
transaction condition as in developed country, but the rest of the population have lower
transaction efficiency.
The production conditions are the same for all individuals in the same country, but
different between the countries. Hence, the production functions for a type i consumer-producer
are
(2a) xj + xj
s = Ljx
c, yj + yj
s = Ljy, j = a, b.
(2b) x2 + x2
s = L2x




s  are respective quantities of the two goods sold by a type i person; Lis is the amount
of labor allocated to the production of good s (= x, y) by a type i person, and Lix + Liy = B > 1.
For simplicity, we assume that B = 2. It is assumed that r, c > 1. This system of production
functions and endowment constraint displays economies of specialization in producing good x
and constant returns to specialization in producing good y. But an individual in country 2 has a
higher productivity in producing good y than an individual in country 1. Economies of
specialization are individual specific and activity specific, that is they are localized increasing
returns, which are compatible with the Walrasian regime.
If all individuals allocate the same amount of labor to the production of each goods, then
an individual in country 1 has the same average labor productivity of good x as an individual in
country 2. But the average and marginal labor productivity of good y for an individual in country8
2 is higher. This is similar to the situation in a Ricardian model with exogenous comparative
advantage. Country 1’s productivities are not higher than country 2 in producing all goods, but
may have exogenous comparative advantage in producing good x. But if an individual in country
2 allocates much more labor to the production of x than an individual in country 1, her
productivity is higher than that of the latter. Similarly, if an individual in country 1 allocates
more labor to the production of good x than an individual in country 2, her productivity of good x
will be higher. This is referred to as endogenous comparative advantage, since individuals’
decisions on labor allocation determine difference in productivity between them. But an
individual in country 1 has no endogenous comparative advantage in producing good y since her
marginal and average productivity of y is always 1, lower than r, independent of her labor
allocation. However, country 1 has exogenous comparative advantage in producing x and country
2 has exogenous comparative advantage in producing y.
The decision problem for a type i individual involves deciding on what and how much to
produce for self-consumption, to sell and to buy from the market.  In other words, the individual







d , , , , , ‡ 0.  Hence, there are 2
6 = 64 possible corner and
interior solutions. As shown by Wen (1998), for such a model, an individual never
simultaneously sells and buys the same good, never simultaneously produces and buys the same
good, and never sells more than one good. We refer to each individual’s choice of what to
produce, buy and sell that is consistent with the Wen theorem as a configuration.
There are three configurations from which the individuals can choose:
(1) self sufficiency.  Configuration A, where an individual produces both goods for self-
consumption.  This configuration is defined by








i i i y y x x y x , i = a, b, 2.
(2) specialization in producing good x.  Configuration (x/y), where an individual produces only
x, sells x in exchange for y, is defined by








i i y y x y x x .
(3) specialization in producing good y.  Configuration (y/x), where an individual produces only
y, sells y in exchange for x, is defined by








i i x x y x y y .9
The combination of all individual’s configurations constitutes a market structure, or
structure for short.  Given the configurations listed above, five structures may occur in
equilibrium.
country 1  country 2       country 1    country 2     country 1  country 2
(1) Structure AAA (2) Structure PAY      (3) Structure XAP
  country 1 country 2     country 1    country 2       country 1    country 2
    (4) Structure DAY      (5) Structure XAY (6) Structure XPY
country 1 country 2 country 1 country 2 country 1 country 2
      (7) Structure XXP    (8) Structure XXD     (9) Structure XXY
Figure 1: Configurations and Structures
Structure AAA, as shown in panel (1) of Fig. 1, is an autarky structure where individuals in both
countries choose self-sufficiency (configuration A).  Here, the first two letters denote the
configurations chosen by type a and type b persons, respectively in country 1 and the third letter10
denotes the configuration chosen by individuals in country 2. In each panel up-left circles
represent configurations chosen by type a individuals, down-left circles represent configurations
chosen by type b individuals, and circles on the right hand side represent configurations chosen
by individuals in country 2,
Structure PAY, shown in panel (2) of Fig. 1, means that some type a persons choose
configuration (x/y) and others choose autarky, all type b persons choose autarky, and individuals
in country 2 choose configuration (y/x). Letter P stands for a type persons partially involved in
the division of labor: some of them completely specialize and others choose autarky. This
structure involves three types of dual structure. In a type I dual structure ex ante identical
individuals are divided between specialization and autarky. In a type II dual structure, different
types of individuals in the same country are divided between specialization and autarky. In a type
III dual structure, one country is completely involved in the division of labor, while some
residents in the other country are self-sufficient.
Structure XAP, shown in panel (3) of Fig. 1, means that all type a persons choose
configuration (x/y), all type b persons choose autarky, some individuals in country 2 choose (y/x)
and others choose autarky.
Structure DAY, shown in panel (4) of Fig. 1, means that some type a persons choose (x/y)
and others choose (y/x), all type b persons choose autarky, and individuals in country 2 choose
(y/x). Letter D stands for division of individuals of a certain type between (x/y) and (y/x).
Structure XAY, shown in panel (5) of Fig. 1, means that all type a persons choose (x/y),
all type b persons choose autarky, and individuals in country 2 choose configuration (y/x).
Structure XAD implies that all type a persons choose (x/y), all type b persons choose
autarky, some individuals in country 2 choose (y/x) and others choose (x/y).
Structure XPY, shown in panel (6), means that all type a persons choose (x/y), some type
b persons choose autarky and others choose (x/y), and individuals in country 2 choose
configuration (y/x).
Structure XXP, shown in panel (7), means that all type a and type b persons choose (x/y),
some individuals in country 2 choose configuration (y/x), and others choose autarky.
Structure XXD, shown in panel (8), means that all type a and type b persons choose (x/y),
some individuals in country 2 choose configuration (y/x), and others choose (x/y).11
Structure XXY, shown in panel (9), implies all type a and type b persons choose (x/y) and
all individuals in country 2 choose configuration (y/x).
Structure XDY means that all type a persons choose (x/y), some and type b individuals
choose (x/y) and others choose (y/x), all individuals in country 2 choose configuration (y/x).
Structure YDY means that all type a persons choose (y/x), some type b individuals
choose (x/y) and others choose (y/x), all individuals in country 2 choose configuration (y/x).
Structure DXY means that some type a persons and all type b persons choose (x/y), other
type a persons choose (y/x), all individuals in country 2 choose configuration (y/x).
Structure DYY means that some type a persons and all type b persons choose (y/x), other
type a persons choose (x/x), all individuals in country 2 choose configuration.
It can be shown that other structures cannot occur in equilibrium.
3. General Equilibrium and Its Inframarginal Comparative Statics
According to Zhou, Sun, and Yang (1998), a general equilibrium exists and is Pareto optimal for
the kind of the models in this paper under the assumptions that the set of individuals is a
continuum, preferences are strictly increasing and rational; both local increasing returns and
constant returns are allowed in production and transactions. Also, the set of equilibrium
allocations is equivalent to the set of core allocations. An equilibrium in this model is defined as
a relative price of the two goods and all individuals’ labor allocations and trade plans, such that
(a) Each individual maximizes her utility, that is, the consumption bundle generated by her labor
allocation and trade plan maximizes utility function (1) for given p.
(b) All markets clear.
For simplicity, we assume that b = 0.5. Let the number (measure) of type i individuals choosing
configuration (x/y) be Mix, that choosing (y/x) be Miy, and that choosing A be MiA.
Since the interior solution is never optimal in this model of endogenous specialization
and there are many structures based on corner solutions, we cannot use standard marginal
analysis to solve for a general equilibrium. We adopt a two step approach to solving for a general
equilibrium. In the first step, we consider a structure. Each individual’s utility maximizing
decision is solved for the given structure. Utility equalization condition between individuals
choosing different configurations in the same country and market clearing condition are used to12
solve the relative price of traded goods and numbers (measure) of individuals choosing different
configurations. The relative price and numbers, and associated resource allocation are referred to
as a corner equilibrium for this structure.
According to the definition, a general equilibrium is a corner equilibrium in which all
individuals have no incentive to deviate, under the corner equilibrium relative price, from their
chosen configurations. Hence, in the second step, we can plug the corner equilibrium relative
price into the indirect utility function for each configuration, then compare corner equilibrium
values of utility across all configurations. The comparisons are called total cost-benefit analysis
which yields the conditions under which the corner equilibrium utility in each constituent
configuration of this structure is not smaller than any alternative configuration. This system of
inequalities can thus be used to identify a subspace of parameter space within which this corner
equilibrium is a general equilibrium.
With the existence theorem of general equilibrium proved by Zhou, Sun, and Yang
(1998), we can completely partition the parameter space into subspaces, within each of which the
corner equilibrium in a structure is a general equilibrium. As parameter values shift between the
subspaces, the general equilibrium will discontinuously jump between structures. The
discontinuous jumps of structure and all endogenous variables are called inframarginal
comparative statics of general equilibrium.
We now take the first step of the inframarginal analysis. As an example, we consider
structure XAP. Assume that in this structure, M2y individuals choose configuration (y/x) and M2A
individuals choose autarky in country 2, where M2y + M2A = M2. Ma individuals choose
configuration (x/y) and Mb individuals choose configuration A in country 1. Since all individuals
in country 2 are ex ante identical in all aspects, the maximum utilities in configurations A and
(y/x) must be the same in country 2 in equilibrium. Marginal analysis of the decision problem for
an individual in country 2 choosing autarky yields her maximum utility in configuration A: U2A =
(r2
c+1g)
0.5, where g ” c
c/(c+1)
c+1. Marginal analysis of the decision problem for an individual in
country 2 choosing configuration (y/x) yields the demand function x2
d = r/p, the supply function
y2
s = r,
 and indirect utility function: U2y = r(k/p)
0.5. The utility equalization condition U2y = U2A
yields p ” px/py = kr/2
c+1g. Similarly, the marginal analysis of the decision problem of a type a






 and indirect utility function: U1x = 2
c-1(kp)
0.5. The marginal analysis of the
decision problem for a type b individual choosing configuration A in country 1 yields her
maximum utility in autarky UbA = (2
c+1g)
0.5. Inserting the corner equilibrium relative price into
the market clearing condition for good x, Maxxa
s = M2yx2
d, yields the number of individuals
selling good y, M2y = kMa/4g, Max = Ma, and Mbx = Mb. Indirect utility functions for individuals
choosing various configurations in the two countries are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Indirect Utility Functions
Indirect utility functions
Configurations (x/y) (y/x) A
Type a person Uax = 2
c-1(kp)
0.5 Uay = (k/ p)
0.5 UaA = (2
c+1g)
0.5
Type b person Ubx = 2
c-1(tp)
0.5 Uby = (t/ p)
0.5 UbA = (2
c+1g)
0.5
Country 2 U2x = 2
c-1(kp)
0.5 U2y = r(k/p)
0.5 U2A = (2
c+1rg)
0.5
Following this procedure, we can solve for corner equilibrium in each structure. The
solutions of all corner equilibria are summarized in Table 2. Then we can take the second step to
carry out total cost-benefit analysis for each corner equilibrium and to identify the parameter
subspace within which the corner equilibrium is a general equilibrium. Consider the corner
equilibrium in structure XAP as an example again.14
Table 2: Corner Equilibria
Structure Relative price of
x to y
Numbers of individuals choosing various
configurations
AAA MaA = Ma, MbA = Mb, M2A = M2
PAY g2





1-c Max=(Ma+rM2)/2, May=(Ma-rM2)/2, MbA=Mb, M2y = M2
XAY M2r2
1-c/Ma MaA = Ma, MbA = Mb, M2y = M2
XAD r2
1-c Max=Ma, MbA=Mb, M2y=(Ma+M2)/2
XPY g2
3-c/k Max=Ma, Mbx=(krM2/4g)-Ma, M2y=M2
XXP kr/g2
c+1 Max=Ma, Mbx=Mb,





1-c/(Ma+Mb) Max=Ma, Mbx=Mb, M2y=M2
XDY 2
1-c Max=Ma, Mbx=(Mb-Ma+rM2)/2, Mby=(Ma+Mb-rM2)/2,
M2y=M2
YDY 2
1-c May=Ma, Mbx=(Ma+Mb+rM2)/2, Mby=(Mb-Ma-rM2)/2,
M2y=M2
DXY 2
1-c Mbx=Mb, Max=(Ma-Mb+rM2)/2, May=(Ma+Mb-rM2)/2,
M2y=M2
DYY 2
1-c Mbx=Mb, Mbx=(Ma+Mb+rM2)/2, May=(Ma-Mb-rM2)/2,
M2y=M2
In this structure Ma individuals choose configuration (x/y) and MbA individuals choose
autarky in country 1, and M2y individuals choose configuration (y/x) and M2A individuals choose
autarky in country 2. For a type a person in country 1, equilibrium requires that her utility in
configuration (x/y) is not smaller than in configurations (y/x) and A under the corner equilibrium
relative price in structure XAY. Also equilibrium requires that all type b persons in country 1
prefer autarky to configurations (x/y) and (y/x) and that all individuals in country 2 are
indifferent between configurations (y/x) and A and receive a utility level that is not lower than in
configuration (x/y). In addition, this structure occurs in equilibrium only if M2y˛(0, M2). All the
conditions imply
Uax ‡ Uay, Uax ‡ UaA, UbA ‡ Ubx, UbA ‡ Uby,
U2A = U2y  ‡ U2x, M2y˛(0, M2),15
where indirect utility functions in different configurations and corner equilibrium relative price
are given in Tables 1 and 2. The conditions define a parameter subspace:
kt < 16g
2/r, k˛ (4g/￿r, Min{4g, 4M2g/Ma}),
where g ” c
c/(c+1)
c+1.
 Within this parameter subspace, the corner equilibrium in structure XAP is
the general equilibrium. Following this procedure, we can do total cost-benefit analysis for each
structure. The total cost-benefit analysis in the second step and marginal analysis of each corner
equilibrium in the first step yields inframarginal comparative statics of general equilibrium,
summarized in Table 3. From this Table, we can see that the parameter subspaces for structure
AAD, XAA, and all structures in which country 1 exports y and country 2 exports x to occur in
general equilibrium are empty.
Table 3: General Equilibrium Structure: Inframarginal Comparative Statics
t < k < 4g t < 4g < k














































































































where  g ” c
c/ (1+c)
c+1. X stands for configuration (x/y) chosen by individuals of a certain type, Y
stands for (y/x) chosen by individuals of a certain type, A stands for autarky, P stands for the
partial division of labor where individuals of a certain type are divided between autarky and
specialization, D stands for the division of individuals of a certain type between (x/y) and (y/x).
Structure XAP involves type I and type II dual structures, Structure XXP involves type I and type
III dual structures. Structures DAY, XAY, XAD involve type II and type III dual structures.
Structures PAY and XPY involve all three types of dual structure.
When a dual structure occurs in equilibrium individuals in autarky look like
underemployed or in underdevelopment in the sense that it receives none of gains from trade and
income differential between them and other individuals who are involved in the division of labor
increases as a result of a shift of equilibrium from AAA to a dual structure. These self-sufficient
individuals cannot find a job to work for the market. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium
structures.
5 We say the level of division of labor increases if occurrence of letter A or P decreases
and/or the occurrence of letter D, X, and/or Y increases in the equilibrium structure. We can
identify five levels of division of labor. The lowest one is associated with structure AAA where
all three types of individuals are self-sufficient. The second level is associated with structures
PAY and XAP in each of which two types of individuals are self-sufficient. The third level is
associated with structures DAY, XAY, XAD in each of which all of individuals of a certain type
are self-sufficient. The fourth level is associated with structures XPY and XXP in each of which
only part of the population of a certain type are self-sufficient. The fifth level is associated with
structures XXD, XXY, XDY, YDY, DXY, DYY, in each of which all individuals are
specialized.
With the definition of division of labor in mind, we can now have a close examination of
Table 3. As transaction conditions are improved, the equilibrium level of division of labor
increases. If the equilibrium level of division of labor increases from level 1 to level 2, then dual
structure emerges, or duality of economic structure increases. If the equilibrium level of division
of labor increases from 2 to 3, the duality decreases as those individuals who are left behind catch
up. If the equilibrium level of division of labor increases from 3 to 4, the duality increases again
as some of individuals in a group that was in autarky before choose specialization. As the
                                                
5 The coexistence of two equilibria distinguishes the model of endogenous specialization from a standard Arrow-17
equilibrium level of division of labor increases from 4 to 5, the duality decreases again as those
who were left behind catch up. But it is also possible, improvements in transaction conditions
generate a jump of equilibrium from level 2 to level 4 of division of labor. Such a jump will
reduce duality. A jump from level 3 of division of labor to level 5 will reduce duality too.
This analysis implies that as different groups of the same type or different types of
individuals gradually choose higher level of specialization one by one, the degree of duality
fluctuates. Its increase will raise inequality of income distribution and its decrease will reduce
inequality. Hence, as different individuals are gradually involved in the network of division of
labor as a result of improved transaction conditions, the equilibrium degree of inequality
fluctuates. It does not monotonically increases or decreases. The relationship between inequality
and per capita real income may not be an inverted U-curve.
Inserting the corner equilibrium relative price in Table 2 into indirect utility functions in
Table 1, we can compare the difference of per capita real incomes (equilibrium levels of utility)
of two types of individuals in country 1, considering the parameter subspaces that demarcate the
structures. The comparisons confirm our analysis. We first consider the path of evolution in
division of labor: AAAﬁXAPﬁ XAYﬁXPYﬁXXY. The difference in per capita real income
between type a and type b individuals in country 1 is 0 in structure AAA. It is positive in
structure XAP. It decreases as the equilibrium jumps from XAP to XAY. It then increases as the
equilibrium jumps from XAY to XPY. It decreases again as the equilibrium jumps from XPY to
XXY.
We can find other evolutionary paths of division of labor with fluctuating degree of
inequality of income distribution. Also, comparisons of ratios of the highest to the lowest real
income between corner equilibria generate similar results.
All the results on evolution of division of labor, dual structure, and trade pattern are
summarized in the following proposition, illustrated in Fig. 1.
Proposition 1: As transaction efficiency increases from a very low to a very high level, the
equilibrium level of domestic and international division of labor increases from complete
autarky in both countries to the complete division of labor in both countries. As different
                                                                                                                                                            
Debreu equilibrium model in which the number of multiple equilibria is always odd.18
individuals are gradually involved in the division of labor, the duality of economic
structure fluctuates, generating fluctuation of the equilibrium degree of inequality of
income distribution in the less developed country. This degree is neither monotonically
increasing nor monotonically decreasing. The relationship between the inequality and per
capita real income might not be of U-curve.
The inframarginal comparative statics of general equilibrium in Table 3 can be used to
establish two corollaries. The first is that evolution in division of labor generated by
improvements in transaction conditions will raise equilibrium aggregate productivity. In order to
establish the above statement, we consider the aggregate PPF for individual 1 (from country 1)
and individual 2 (from country 2). As shown in Fig. 2 where c = 2, the PPF for individual 1 is
curve BC, that for individual 2 is curve AC. In autarky, the two persons’ optimum decisions for
taste parameter b˛(0, 1) are functions of b. Let b change from 0 to 1; we can calculate values of
Y = y1+y2 and X = x1+x2 as functions of b. The values of X and Y for different values of b
constitute curve EGH in Fig. 2. The equilibrium aggregate production schedule in structure AAA
is a point on the curve, dependent on value of b. But the aggregate PPF for the two individuals is
the curve EFH. Since in a structure with complete division of labor the equilibrium production
schedule is point F which is on the aggregate PPF, the aggregate productivity in a structure with
the complete division of labor is higher than in structure AAA. The difference between EFH and
EGH can be considered as economies of division of labor.
Figure 2:  Economies of Division of Labor Based on
Endogenous and Exogenous Comparative Advantage19
Following the same reasoning, we can prove that the equilibrium aggregate productivity
in a dual structure is lower than the PPF. Hence, proposition 1 implies that as transaction
efficiencies are improved, the equilibrium level of division of labor and equilibrium aggregate
productivity increase side by side.
The second corollary is that deterioration of a country’s terms of trade and increase of
gains received by this country from trade may concur. Suppose that the initial values of
parameters satisfy (Ma+Mb)/M2 ˛(￿r, r), Ma/M2 ˛(1, r), kt>16g
2/r. Within this parameter
subspace, Suppose that the initial value of t satisfies t' < 4g(Ma+Mb)/M2r. Table 3 indicates that
structure XPY occurs in equilibrium where country 1's terms of trade is p' = g2
3-c/t'. Now assume
that t increases to the value t", so that t" > 4g(Ma+Mb)/M2. According to Table 3, the equilibrium
jumps to structure XXY where country 1's terms of trade is p" = M2r2
1-c/(Ma+Mb). It can then be
shown that country 1’s terms of trade deteriorate as a result of the change in t within the
parameter subspace. But this shift of the equilibrium from XPY to XXY increases utility of each
individual in country 1 if k'/t' < k"M2r/4g(Ma+Mb). This has established the claim that there exists
some parameter subspace within which the deterioration of a country’s terms of trade may concur
with an increase of gains that this country receives from trade. There are other parameter
subspaces within which changes in parameters may generate concurrence of the deterioration of
one country’s terms of trade and an increase in its gains from trade.
6
This corollary generates the following policy implications. In the transitional stage of
economic development and globalization, the terms of trade are against the less developed
country that has relatively low transaction efficiency: some residents in the less developed
country receive autarky utility and most gains from trade go to the developed country. There are
two policies to change this inferior position. One is to impose tariff to improve terms of trade and
the other is to improve transaction condition to expand network of trade. The former is to
increase share of gains received by the less developed country from a shrunk pie because of the
deadweight caused by tariff.  The latter is to get greater share of gains from trade by enlarging the
pie. The expanded network of division of labor can generate productivity gains. As long as
productivity improvements outpace the deterioration of terms of trade, the less developed country
                                                
6 Empirical and theoretical research on economic development and terms of trade can be found, for instance from
Morgan (1970), Kohli and Werner (1998), Sen (1998).20
can receive more gains from trade not only because of productivity gains, but also because of
more equal division of gains from trade between the countries as all individuals are involved in
the international and domestic division of labor.
4. Effects of Trade on Income Distribution in the Developed Country
Since we assume that there is only one type of individuals in the developed country which has
better transaction condition, the model in the previous section cannot explore effects of economic
development and international trade on income distribution in the developed country. In this
section we extend the model in the previous section by specifying two types of individuals in the
developed country. The new model is exactly same as previous one except that there are two
types of individuals in country 2 as well. Types 1a and 1b of individuals are in country 1 and
types 2a and 2b of individuals are in country 2. For type 2a individuals, transaction efficiency is
k, for type 1b individuals, transaction efficiency is t, and for type 2b and 1a individuals,
transaction efficiency is s, where 1‡k>s>t‡0.
For simplicity, we assume that M1a = M1b = M2a = M2b = ¼. Following the method in the
previous section, the inframarginal comparative statics of this new model can be solved as in
Table 4.





























where g ” c
c/ (1+c)
c+1, X denotes configuration (x/y), Y denotes (y/x), P denotes a division of
individuals of a certain type between specialization and autarky, D denotes a division of
individuals of a certain type between (x/y) and (y/x). The first of four letters denoting a structure
represents the configuration chosen by type 1a persons, the second represents that chosen by type21
1b persons, the third represents that chosen by type 2a persons, and the fourth represents that
chosen by type 2b persons.
Figure 3: Evolution in Division of Labor
Figure 3 gives an intuitive illumination of the evolution of division of labor and economic
development as a result of improvements in transaction conditions. In this figure, an arrow ﬁ
denotes the direction of evolution of division of labor, the numbers 1 and 2 beside the arrows
denote the two countries, and signs + and – denote increase and decrease, respectively, of
inequality of income distribution in a country. Mark ? implies that either an increase or decrease
of inequality is possible.  From the results, we can see that although evolutionary paths of
division of labor AAAAﬁAADAﬁXAYAﬁ XAYDﬁXXYY generates an inverted curve of
inequality in the less developed country, path AAAAﬁXAPAﬁXPYAﬁXAYPﬁXXYY
generates fluctuation of inequality. Other paths with ? may generate such fluctuation too. Again,
inframarginal comparative statics of general equilibrium confirm proposition 1 even if income
distribution in the developed country is considered. This yields proposition 2.
Proposition 2: As transaction efficiency is improved, the equilibrium level of division of
labor and aggregate productivity increase. The degree of inequality of income distribution
in the less developed country and developed country fluctuates as duality of economic
structure fluctuates. The degree of inequality is nonmonotonic and it might not be an
inverted U-curve.22
An interesting feature of our inframarginal analysis of general equilibrium is that economic
development and structural changes can take place in the absence of changes of tastes and
production functions. All development and trade phenomena can generated by changes in
transaction conditions which are neither of demand side nor of supply side. Hence, it explores the
limitation of the analysis that explains trade and development phenomena by changes in demand
and/or supply sides. All recent general equilibrium models of "high development economics"
share this feature (see Fujita and Krugman 1995, Krugman and Venables, 1995, Kelly, 1997, Shi
and Yang, 1995, Yang, 1991, and Yang and Rice, 1994, for instance).
5.  Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a theory of ratcheting inequality and equality of income
distribution using inframarginal analysis of a model of endogenous specialization. This theory
accommodates the empirical evidence for the coexistence of positive and negative correlation
between inequality and economic development which relates to trade. Because of the trade off
between economies of division of labor and transaction costs, the equilibrium level of division of
labor increases as transaction conditions are improved. If transaction conditions are different
between countries or between different groups of individuals in the same countries, different
individuals will be involved in the division of labor sequentially. If some individuals have a
higher level of specialization (or commercialization) than other individuals, a dual structure will
increase inequality of income distribution. As those poor individuals increase their levels of
specialization, the dual structure disappears and inequality decreases. But as the level of division
of labor increases further, while some individuals' levels of specialization increases before others'
do, a new dual structure will occur and then it disappears as latecomers catch up. This ratcheting
process generates fluctuation of the equilibrium degree of inequality as division of labor evolves.
Therefore, there is neither a monotonic relationship between inequality of income distribution
and economic development nor an inverted U-curve. In other words, inequality (equality) of
income distribution is irrelevant to economic development. We should pay more attention to
improvements in transaction conditions that will enhance aggregate productivity and all23
individuals' welfare than to the relationship between inequality and economic development (or
trade).
A logical extension of this paper is to add more goods and/or more countries and
introduce tariff into the Ricardian model. More structures may occur in equilibrium and the
ratcheting process will be more pronounced. If political economics of income distribution and
rent seeking is considered, negative effects of unfair income distribution on economic
development may be analyzed.24
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